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CONTRACTS – MINES AND MINERALS:  NORTH DAKOTA 
REJECTS EXTENTIONS OF OIL PRODUCTION CONTRACTS 
ON UNUSED LAND 
Tank v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp., 2014 ND 123, 848 N.W.2d 691 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In Tank v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp., the North Dakota Supreme Court 
held that the drilling operations clause of an oil and gas lease failed to 
preserve the operator’s right to extend the lease over unused portions of the 
land in the presence of an enforceable Pugh clause.  The court, reviewing a 
district court summary judgment decision quieting title to Greggory Tank, 
reasoned that a failure to allow the Pugh clause to govern the drilling 
operations clause would make the Pugh clause wholly ineffective.  
Therefore, the court’s holding in Tank focused on the Pugh clause language 
describing the severability of the parcel from the rest of the leasehold.  Tank 
provides a clear avenue to landowners who wish to terminate oil and gas 
leases on parcels of land where no drilling operations have recently 
occurred, even if drilling operations have continued under the same lease on 
adjoining parcels. 
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I.  FACTS 
In 1982, George and Phyllis Tank signed an oil and gas lease with a 
three-year primary term covering property in McKenzie County, North 
Dakota.1  Although the parties ratified an extension of the primary term 
through 1989, production on the property continued for many years.2  The 
Tank’s successor, Greggory Tank, filed a lawsuit in district court in 2011 
against the operators under the lease seeking a determination that the oil and 
 
1.  Tank v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp., 2014 ND 123, ¶ 2, 848 N.W. 2d 691, 694.  
2.  Id. 
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gas lease had lapsed on the southwest quarter of the property.3  The Citation 
Oil & Gas Corporation and the other oil and gas operators under the lease 
filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that production on other 
portions of the property under the lease was sufficient to hold the entire 
lease in effect during the period.4  Tank filed a cross-motion for summary 
judgment and argued that, under the Pugh clause of the lease, the operator’s 
failure to maintain production on the southwest quarter of the property 
allowed it to be severed.5 
The district court denied the operator’s motion for summary judgment 
and sided with Tank, determining that the lapse in production on the 
southwest quarter was sufficient to cancel the lease.6  The court found that, 
between October 1, 2008 and October 30, 2009, production ceased on the 
southwest quarter, justifying the quieting of title in Tank.7  The defendants 
appealed the district court’s decision.8 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Although oil and gas leases follow the rules of interpretation for 
contracts in general,9 courts must consider additional legal rules when 
interpreting them.  Specifically, oil and gas contracts must address concerns 
for conservation of oil and gas and the protection of correlative rights.10  
The rule of capture11 created a regime which encouraged over drilling and 
the premature dissipation of natural reservoir energy.12  Conservation 
regulation, including pooling or unitization of oil and gas leases, is one way 
policymakers have attempted to address these concerns.13  However, even 
as pooling or unitization has promoted the preservation of the entirety of an 
oil and gas lease to protect correlative rights, the lessor’s ability to obtain 
revenue on a non-producing, non-pooled portion of the leased property has 
been jeopardized.14  Absent a Pugh clause, a lessor’s only alternative would 
 
3.  Id. ¶ 6. 
4.  Id. 
5.  Id. 
6.  Id.  ¶ 7, 848 N.W.2d at 694-95. 
7.  Id.  at 695. 
8.  Id.  ¶ 1, 848 N.W.2d at 694. 
9.  Egeland v. Cont’l Res., Inc., 2000 ND 169, ¶ 10, 616 N.W.2d 861, 864.  
10.  BRUCE M. KRAMER & PATRICK H. MARTIN, THE LAW OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION § 
2.01 (3d ed. 2014). 
11.  Under the rule of capture, “the owner of a tract of land acquires title to the oil or gas 
which he produces from wells on his land, though part of the oil or gas may have migrated from 
adjoining lands.”  Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 561-62 (Tex. 1948). 
12.  KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 10, at § 2.01. 
13.  Id. 
14.  Id.  at § 9.01 
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be under the implied covenant of reasonable development.15  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court’s first impression of the effect of a Pugh clause on 
an oil and gas lease occurred in Egeland v. Continental Resources, Inc.16 
A. POOLING AND UNITIZATION OF OIL PRODUCTION UNITS 
Pooling and unitization of oil production units began as a method of 
protecting correlative rights.17  Pooling can have a significant impact on the 
duration of a lease.18  A “principal effect of the pooling or the unitization of 
a lease in most states is to preserve the entire lease even if only a portion, 
however small, of the lease is included in the unit.”19  Pooling, therefore, 
can create quite harsh consequences for the lessor, whose interest may be 
diluted by having only a small portion of his leased land included in a 
pooled unit with other interests.20  Even if the well is on the property of 
another in the pooled unit, the lessor may be disadvantaged by having the 
lease continue on the remaining non-pooled portions of his or her lease, 
removing an incentive for the lessee to continue development on that 
portion of the property.21 
In North Dakota, pooling can be either voluntary or forced by the 
North Dakota Industrial Commission (“Commission”) order under North 
Dakota Century Code section 38-08-08(1).22  If the pooling is voluntary, 
then the parties with interests in the pool have the opportunity to set up the 
contract to address concerns they may have.  On the other hand, if the 
pooling is forced by an order from the Commission, the pooling is required 
to be set up in a way that ensures each owner will receive his or her “just 
and equitable share.”23  The Legislature tasked the Commission with 
encouraging the production of oil and gas while protecting correlative rights 
through efforts such as pooling.24 
 
15.  See Hermon Hanson Oil Syndicate v. Bentz,  40 N.W.2d 304, 307-08 (N.D. 1949). 
16.  2000 ND 169, ¶ 15, 616 N.W.2d 861, 866. 
17.  KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 10, at § 2.02. 
18.  EUGENE KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 26.13 (2014). 
19.  Egeland, ¶ 16, 616 N.W.2d at 866 (quoting KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 10, at § 
9.01).  
20.  See Will-Drill Res., Inc. v. Huggs, Inc., 738 So. 2d 1196, 1200 (La. Ct. App. 1999).  
21.  KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 10, at § 9.01. 
22.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-08(1) (2014) (stating that “[w]hen two or more separately 
owned tracts are embraced within a spacing unit, or when there are separately owned interests in 
all or a part of the spacing unit, then the owners and royalty owners thereof may pool their 
interests for the development and operation of the spacing unit.  In the absence of voluntary 
pooling, the commission upon the application of any interested person shall enter an order pooling 
all interests in the spacing unit for the development and operations thereof.”). 
23.  Id. 
24.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-07(1) (2014). 
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B. THE INDIVISIBILITY OF OIL AND GAS LEASES AND THE  
PURPOSE OF THE PUGH CLAUSE 
To identify how a Pugh clause may affect the pooling of a lease, one 
must examine the rules of interpretation for oil and gas leases.  The same 
rules that govern interpretation of general contractual agreements also 
govern the interpretation of oil and gas contracts.25  Words in an oil and gas 
contract are construed in their “ordinary and popular sense” unless the 
parties defined the terms or used them in a technical sense.26  Contracts are 
also read in light of existing statutes, with the statute read into the contract 
as if it were a term.27  Contracts are interpreted, if possible, to give effect to 
every provision.28  Lastly, a contract must also be considered in its entirety 
to determine the true intent of the parties.29 
Oil and gas contracts, however, have additional legal rules. Normally, 
an oil and gas lease is indivisible by its nature.30  Operations on, or 
production from, any part of the land in an oil and gas lease will ordinarily 
extend the entire lease beyond the primary term.31  If part or all of the land 
under a lease is pooled, production anywhere in the pool is normally 
sufficient to extend the lease, even if the production is not on the leased 
land.32  Lastly, an oil and gas lease is often construed in favor of the lessor 
because the lessee normally drafts the lease.33 
In 1947, a Louisiana lawyer named Pugh drafted a clause intended to 
prevent the lessor’s unpooled land from being disadvantaged by production 
on pooled lands.34  The purpose of what is now known as a “Pugh” clause is 
“to protect the lessor from the anomaly of having the entire property held 
 
25.  Egeland, ¶ 10, 616 N.W.2d at 864. 
26.  Id. 
27.  Id. 
28.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-06 (2014) (“The whole of a contract is to be taken together so 
as to give effect to every part if reasonably practicable.  Each clause is to help interpret the 
others.”).  See also Kortum v. Johnson, 2008 ND 154, ¶ 44, 755 N.W.2d 432, 447. 
29.  Egeland, ¶ 10, 616 N.W.2d at 864. 
30.  Id.  ¶ 16, 616 N.W.2d at 866 (citing Shown v. Getty Oil, 645 S.W.2d 555, 560 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1982)).  
31.  Id.  (citing SMK Energy Corp. v. Westchester Gas Co., 705 S.W.2d 174, 176 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1982)).  
32.  See N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-08(1) (2014) (stating that “[o]perations incident to the 
drilling of a well upon any portion of a spacing unit covered by a pooling order must be deemed, 
for all purposes, the conduct of such operations upon each separately owned tract in the drilling 
unit by the several owners thereof.  That portion of the production allocated to each tract included 
in a spacing unit covered by a pooling order must, when produced, be deemed for all purposes to 
have been produced from such tract by a well drilled thereon.”). 
33.  West v. Alpar Res., Inc., 298 N.W.2d 484, 490-91 (N.D. 1980). 
34.  Egeland, ¶ 17, 616 N.W.2d at 866 (citing Shown, 645 S.W.2d at 560). 
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under a lease by production from a very small portion.”35  However, the 
Pugh clause is also designed to “foster . . . reasonable development of 
leased property.”36  While the goal of a Pugh clause is to sever the lease 
when the leasehold is comprised of several parts, Pugh clauses can vary 
widely in form.37  Nonetheless, a Pugh clause must be explicit in the lease, 
directing the division of the lease into several parts and stating that 
production on the pooled portion does not constitute production on the non-
pooled portion.38 
C. EGELAND V. CONTINENTAL RESOURCES, INC. 
The North Dakota Supreme Court addressed the applicability of a Pugh 
clause39 to lands not committed to a spacing unit most recently in Egeland 
v. Continental Resources, Inc.40  In that case, Egeland entered into two oil 
and gas leases with Cenex in 1991.41  The leases contained both a 
continuous drilling operations clause and a Pugh clause.42  Near the 
completion of the five-year primary term, the operator spudded one well in 
each of the five units comprising the leases that had been pooled under a 
compulsory pooling order from the Commission.43  Egeland, the property 
owner and plaintiff, argued that the leases expired on all lands except those 
in the Skull Creek unit, which had begun production prior to the termination 
of the primary term.44  Egeland argued that the Pugh clause and the 
habendum clause were in conflict; he contended the Pugh clause was 
controlling since it was written instead of pre-printed.45  To the contrary, 
 
35.  Id. (quoting Sandefer Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Duhon, 961 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir. 1992)). 
36.  Id. 
37.  Id. 
38.  Id.  at 867 (citing Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Scheib, 726 F.2d 614, 615-16 (10th Cir. 
1984)). 
39.  One commentator argues that the Egeland court actually addressed a “retained-acreage” 
or “continuous-development” clause as opposed to a Pugh clause.  The Egeland clause directly 
limits the usual result of the habendum clause as opposed to a Pugh clause, which directly 
modifies the pooling clause of the lease. In this note, we will follow the North Dakota Supreme 
Court’s language to reduce confusion and focus on the text of the clauses as opposed to semantics.  
See KUNTZ, supra note 18, at § 26.12-13.  
40.  Egeland, ¶ 2, 616 N.W.2d at 861. 
41.  Id. 
42.  Id.  ¶¶ 3-4, 616 N.W.2d at 862-63. 
43.  Id.  ¶¶ 5-6, 616 N.W.2d at 863. 
44.  Id.  ¶ 18, 616 N.W.2d at 867. 
45.  Id.; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-16 (2014) (stating that “[w]hen a contract is partly 
written and partly printed, or when part of it is written or printed under the special directions of 
the parties and with a special view to their intention and the remainder is copied from a form 
originally prepared without special reference to the particular parties and particular contract in 
question, the written parts control the printed parts and the parts which are purely original control 
those which are copied from a form and if the two are absolutely repugnant the latter must be 
disregarded insofar as such repugnancy exists.”). 
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the defendant lessees argued that the Pugh clause was not in conflict with 
the continuous drilling operations clauses because the Pugh clause did not 
“address drilling at the end of the primary term.”46 
The court agreed with the lessees’ construction of the lease provisions 
as not being in conflict with one another.47  The court held that the word 
“ONLY,” as used in the lease’s Pugh clause, limited the impact of 
production under the Pugh clause to only the lands sharing in production; 
however, the word “ONLY” did not mean that the leases could not be 
extended by some other means such as a continuous drilling operations 
clause.48  In addition, the court held that, contrary to the lessor’s argument 
that the continuous drilling operations clause needed to be upheld in each 
unit due to the Pugh clause, the continuous drilling operations clause 
operated on a lease-wide basis.49  The court was concerned that the lessor’s 
interpretation requiring drilling immediately at the expiration of the primary 
term within each unit individually would have a “chilling effect on the 
covenant of reasonable development implied in every lease . . .  recognized 
by this Court at least as far back as 1949.”50  The court explained that no 
previous holding in North Dakota on the covenant of reasonable 
development had ever required simultaneous development in every unit.51  
Furthermore, the court was disinclined to accept a result that favored lessees 
who were recently drilling—since their entire lease was extended under the 
drilling operations clause—as opposed to lessees who had finished drilling 
and were now producing, since their entire lease would not be extended 
under the Pugh clause.52 
III. ANALYSIS 
In Tank v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp., the North Dakota Supreme Court 
held that the Pugh clause of the oil and gas lease severed the lease, quieting 
title in the lessor.53  The court divided the analysis into three parts: an 
examination of the drilling operations clause individually, consideration of 
the Pugh clause individually, and a determination of whether the clauses 
were in conflict with each other.54 
 
46.  Egeland, ¶ 19, 616 N.W.2d at 867. 
47.  Id.  ¶ 27, 616 N.W.2d at 869. 
48.  Id.  at 869-70. 
49.  Id.  ¶ 29, 616 N.W.2d at 870. 
50.  Id.  (citing Hermon Hanson Oil Syndicate v. Bentz, 40 N.W.2d 304, 308 (N.D. 1949)). 
51.  Id.  ¶ 30. 
52.  Id.  at 870-71. 
53.  Tank v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp., 2014 ND 123, ¶¶ 32-33, 848 N.W.2d 691, 701. 
54.  See generally id.  ¶¶ 11–33, 848 N.W.2d at 696-701. 
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A. THE COURT’S INTERPRETATION OF THE DRILLING 
 OPERATIONS CLAUSE 
First, the court examined the oil and gas lease’s drilling operations 
clause, which allowed for the lease to remain in force “so long as operations 
are continuously prosecuted and, if production results therefrom, then as 
long as production continues.”55  The lease also required no more than 
thirty days pass between operations on a well and no more than ninety days 
pass between “completion or abandonment of one well and the beginning of 
operations for the drilling of a subsequent well.”56  Since production 
anywhere on the property will generally extend the lease for the entire 
property,57 the court was required to define the term “production” because it 
was not defined in the lease.58  The court supplied a technical term for 
production:  “production in paying quantities, that is, production in 
quantities sufficient to yield a return in excess of operating costs, even 
though drilling and equipment costs may never be repaid and the 
undertaking considered as a whole may ultimately result in a loss.”59 
Under the supplied definition, the court determined that the lease 
should be extended on the entire premises under the drilling operations 
clause because there had been a producing well located on the property 
during the entire post-primary term period.60 
B. THE COURT’S INTERPRETATION OF THE PUGH CLAUSE 
Secondly, the court examined the Pugh clause under the lease: 
[l]essee may continue to hold this lease in full force and effect as 
to all of said lands for subsequent and successive periods of one 
year by conducing [sic] additional drilling operations on 
undeveloped portions of said lands during each preceding one year 
period.  Should Lessee fail to conduct drilling operations during 
any such one-year period, then this lease shall expire as to said 
lands not included in producing units at the end of the one-year 
period during which no drilling operations were conducted.61 
 
55.  Id.  ¶ 12, 848 N.W.2d at 696. 
56.  Id. 
57.  Id. 
58.  Id. 
59.  Id.  (citing 8 KRAMER & MARTIN, WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL AND GAS LAW MANUAL 
OF TERMS 816 (2013)).  
60.  Id.  ¶ 13.  The Tank 3-10 well on the northwest quarter produced until June 1998 when it 
was replaced with the Tank 3-10R well on the northwest quarter, which produced through the time 
of trial.  Id. 
61.  Id.  ¶ 15, 848 N.W.2d at 697. 
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The lessee’s argued that the Pugh clause was only operative at the end 
of the primary term.62  The court disagreed, finding that the Pugh clause, 
when read as a whole, contemplated future one-year periods.63  The court 
further acknowledged that the Pugh clause required “additional drilling 
operations on undeveloped portions of the land during each one-year 
period.”64  Since the lease did not define “undeveloped,” the court was 
forced to supply a definition for the term.65  The court held that 
“developed” land meant land that had “a completed well capable of 
producing oil or gas in paying quantities.”66  The majority of the court then 
surmised that “undeveloped” land was “land that does not have a completed 
well capable of producing oil or gas in paying quantities.”67  The court 
found that the lease expressly divided the land into producing units, and 
production from a well in a producing unit was not sufficient to maintain 
the lease on non-producing units.68 
Under this interpretation of the Pugh clause, the court found that the 
lease had expired on the southwest quarter of the property due to a lapse in 
production and drilling operations on that quarter from October 1, 2008 to 
October 30, 2009.69  As of July 15, 2009, the one-year term had expired, the 
southwest quarter was not in a producing unit, and no drilling operations 
had been commenced during the prior year.70  Therefore, under the Pugh 
clause, the court held that the lease on the southwest quarter of the property 
had expired.71 
C. WHEN IN CONFLICT, WILL THE PUGH CLAUSE OR DRILLING 
OPERATIONS CLAUSE GOVERN? 
Since the court’s interpretation of the drilling operations clause and 
Pugh clause led to opposite results, the North Dakota Supreme Court  
undertook an analysis of which clause should govern the conflict.72  The 
court stated that allowing the drilling operations clause to govern over the 
 
62.  Id.  ¶ 16. 
63.  Id.  ¶ 17, 848 N.W.2d at 698. 
64.  Id.  ¶ 18. 
65.  Id. 
66.  Id.  (citing 8 KRAMER & MARTIN, WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL AND GAS LAW MANUAL 
OF TERMS 258 (2013)). 
67.  Id. 
68.  Id.  ¶¶ 20-21, 848 N.W.2d at 689-99.  The Pugh clause specifically divided the lease into 
producing units comprising approximately 160 acres or as determined by the appropriate 
governing body of North Dakota. Id. ¶ 23 848 N.W.2d at 699. 
69.  Id.  ¶¶ 22-25. 
70.  Id.  ¶ 27, 848 N.W.2d at 700. 
71.  Id.  ¶ 28. 
72.  Id.  ¶ 27. 
           
436 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:427 
Pugh clause would essentially make the Pugh clause meaningless because 
the lease would continue as long as production continued on any well on the 
property or if drilling operations were commenced.73  The defendant lessees 
argued that the North Dakota Supreme Court should adopt reasoning 
similar to that in Egeland, where the Pugh clause and drilling operations 
clause did not conflict.74 
However, the court maintained that the continuous drilling operations 
clause and Pugh clause in this case were different from those in Egeland.75  
Primarily, the court noted that the Pugh clause in Tank addressed drilling 
operations, while the Pugh clause in Egeland did not.76  Specifically, the 
Tank lease provided that if drilling operations were conducted on 
undeveloped land, the entire lease was to be maintained under both the 
drilling operations and Pugh clauses.77  Therefore, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the Pugh 
clause modified the drilling operations clause by “terminating the lease on 
land not included in a producing unit when additional drilling operations are 
not conducted on undeveloped land during the one-year terms after the 
primary term expires.”78 
D. DISSENT: UNDEVELOPED DOES NOT MEAN  
PREVIOUSLY DEVELOPED. 
Justice Sandstrom provided the court’s lone dissenting opinion.79  The 
dissent disagreed that “undeveloped” land, as noted in the lease, should be 
defined using the definition for “developed” land as “land that has a 
completed well capable of producing oil or gas in paying quantities.”80  
Justice Sandstrom argued that the majority’s opinion seemed to incorporate 
previously developed, but no-longer producing land, into a definition of 
undeveloped.81  Instead, the dissent advocated for a definition of 
undeveloped land or acreage as “acreage not included in producing units or 
in units on which drilling has commenced . . . .”82  The dissent believed that 
Pugh clauses were created not only to protect the lessor, but also to promote 
 
73.  Id.  ¶ 28. 
74.  Id.  ¶ 29. 
75.  Id.  ¶ 32, 848 N.W.2d at 701. 
76.  Id. 
77.  Id. 
78.  Id. 
79.  Id.  ¶ 36, 848 N.W.2d at 702 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting). 
80.  Id.  ¶¶ 39-40. 
81.  Id.  ¶ 42. 
82.  Id.  ¶ 43, 848 N.W.2d at 703 (citing Cmty. Bank of Raymore v. Chesapeake Exploration, 
L.L.C., 416 S.W.3d 750, 755 (Tex. Ct. App. 2013)). 
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reasonable development of leased property.83  Justice Sandstrom argued 
that “once a unit of land has had a producing oil well, a Pugh clause relating 
to ‘undeveloped land’ cannot operate to end the oil and gas lease with 
regard to that unit.”84  Under the dissent’s interpretation, the lease would 
have continued, as the Pugh clause could not have expired on the southwest 
quarter because it had been previously developed.85 
IV. IMPACT ON NORTH DAKOTA PRACTITIONERS 
Although oil and gas related claims have come to the forefront of North 
Dakotan legal discussions due to the Bakken boom, North Dakota 
practitioners often need to look to sister states to determine legal outcomes. 
States such as Texas and Oklahoma have a wealth of legal history on oil 
and gas that North Dakota often lacks.  This lack of information creates 
uncertainty in the legal environment.  In Tank, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court clarified what language is required in Pugh clauses and continuous 
operations clauses. 
A. WRITING A PUGH CLAUSE AFTER TANK 
By upholding the Pugh clause in Tank, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court created a safe haven for landowners looking for appropriate language 
to insert into their land lease contracts.  Because this is the first time North 
Dakota has found a Pugh clause to operate effectively, landowners can take 
guidance from the severability language contained in the Tank lease as they 
draft their own. 
First, when drafting a Pugh clause, landowners will want to ensure that 
their lease specifically discusses producing units less than the size of the 
entire property.  The court’s emphasis on the Tank lease’s definition of a 
“producing unit” as either a state defined area or approximately 160 acres86 
was critical to the court’s finding that the Pugh clause expressly severed the 
lease.87  Furthermore, the careful drafter will verify that the Pugh clause, 
when read as a whole, explicitly discusses periods beyond the end of the 
primary term.  In Tank, the court specifically denied the oil company’s 
assertion that the Pugh clause only operated at the end of the primary term 
 
83.  Id.  ¶ 43. 
84.  Id.  ¶ 44. 
85.  Id.  ¶ 45. 
86.  Id.  ¶ 23, 848 N.W.2d at 699 (majority opinion). 
87.  Id.  ¶ 20, 848 N.W.2d at 698. 
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because of the language in the rest of the paragraph discussing subsequent 
one-year periods.88 
Lastly, a cautious landowner will consider placing a definition of 
“undeveloped” in the lease itself.  Since the discussion between the 
majority and dissent in Tank centered upon this court-supplied definition,89 
drafters can avoid the issue altogether by placing the term in the lease.  
Landowners will prefer the majority’s definition of undeveloped: land “that 
does not have a completed well capable of producing oil or gas in paying 
quantities.”90  On the other hand, it would be in the best interest of oil 
companies operating in North Dakota to provide a definition similar to that 
of the dissent—where undeveloped land “does not include ‘land in 
producing units or in units on which drilling has commenced.’”91 
B. INTEGRATING A PUGH CLAUSE AND CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS 
CLAUSE AFTER TANK 
Drafting an effective Pugh clause, however, is only half the battle 
because the Pugh clause must interact with the continuous operations clause 
in the correct manner.  The critical difference in the court’s analysis 
between Egeland and Tank is that the court in Egeland construed the Pugh 
and continuous drilling operations clauses as working together,92 while the 
court in Tank found them to be in conflict with each other.93  To draft a 
Pugh clause that is effective in light of a continuous drilling operations 
clause, the Tank decision indicates that a lessor should ensure that the Pugh 
clause allows the lease to be continued only if production or drilling occurs 
on the non-pooled land.  The Pugh clause should explicitly indicate that the 
continuous drilling operations clause will not operate lease-wide, but will 
be segregated into a pool-by-pool basis.  This stands in contrast to the 
Egeland Pugh clause, which only required the lessee to fulfill the 
continuous drilling operations clause on a lease-wide basis.94  Since the 
Pugh clause in Egeland was not clear about whether the lease could be 
extended by other means, the court was unwilling to uphold it.  Lessor 
drafters should pay particular attention to the limiting language of the Pugh 
clause and consider something similar to the provision in Tank, which 
 
88.  Id.  ¶¶ 17-18. 
89.  See id.  ¶ 18. 
90.  Id. 
91.  Id.  ¶ 44, 848 N.W.2d at 703 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting) (quoting Cmty. Bank of 
Raymore v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., 416 S.W.3d 750, 755 (Tex. Ct. App. 2013)). 
92.  Egeland v. Cont’l Res., Inc., 2000 ND 169, ¶ 19, 616 N.W.2d 861, 867. 
93.  Tank, ¶ 32, 848 N.W.2d at 701. 
94.  Egeland, ¶ 19, 616 N.W.2d at 869. 
           
2014] CASE COMMENT 439 
indicated that “[s]hould Lessee fail to conduct drilling operations during 
any such one-year period, then this lease shall expire as to said lands not 
included in producing units at the end of the one-year period during which 
no drilling operations were conducted.”95 
V.  CONCLUSION 
North Dakota’s meteoric rise on the national oil production scene is 
increasingly being complemented by an equal increase in judicial precedent 
on oil and gas issues.96  Tank’s holding that a Pugh clause that expressly 
severs a lease for undeveloped lands and expressly operates beyond the 
primary term was the first time a Pugh clause had been held enforceable by 
the North Dakota Supreme Court.  Tank fills a gap in North Dakota’s legal 
regime regarding Pugh clauses in oil and gas leases by providing a path for 
interested parties to ensure their leases are enforceable.  Parties can easily 
contract around the court’s dispute over the definition of “undeveloped” 
described in the dissenting opinion by Justice Sandstrom.  Tank provides 
practical guidance not only to lawyers looking to help clients draft a lease, 
but also to landowners with existing leases that find themselves with only a 
few operations extending the lease on an entire property.  For those 
individuals, the North Dakota Supreme Court has provided relief in Tank. 
Jesse Liebe
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95.  Tank, ¶ 15, 848 N.W.2d at 697. 
96.  See N.D. DEP’T OF MINERAL RESOURCES: OIL AND GAS DIVISION, ND Monthly Oil 
Production Statistics, http://www.dmr nd.gov/oilgas/stats/historicaloilprodstats.pdf (showing that 
oil production has risen from 115,142 barrels of oil per day during December 2006 to 1,114,421 
barrels of oil per day during July 2014). 
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